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Abstract 
The current process of putting ETCS equipment in service is affected by the testing process and laboratory procedures. This 
paper deals with two novel laboratory tools that the EATS project (FP7-TRANSPORT-314219) has produced in order to 
overcome some of the problems those processes show and advance towards the “Zero On-Site Testing” paradigm. On the one 
hand, saboteurs for the internal interfaces of the ETCS on-board system have been created. These saboteurs integrate seamlessly 
with the rest of the elements of the testing laboratory and allow to gather evidences regarding the safety functions of the 
equipment under test. On the other hand, the Wireless Communication Emulators have been also developed. These tools allow to 
put the wireless interfaces of the ETCS on-board equipment in the worst cases it will find in a real environment, by reproducing 
and injecting noise and interferer signals, and measuring the effect in the equipment under test. 
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1. Introduction 
Nomenclature 
BTM Balise Transmission Module 
DMI Driver Machine Interface 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EATS  ETCS Advanced Testing and Smart Train Positioning System 
ERA  European Railway Agency 
ERT  Euroloop Leaky Cable Reference Tool 
ERTMS European Railway Traffic Management System 
ETCS European Train Control System 
EVC European Vital Computer 
FFFIS Form Fit Functional Interface Specification 
GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communications - Railway 
GRM Golden Reference Model 
JRU Juridical Recording Unit 
LTM Loop Transmission Module 
ODO Odometer 
OS Operating System 
SC Scenario Controller 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
THR Tolerable Hazard Rate 
TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability 
TIU Train Interface Unit 
TSOE Test Signal of the On-board Equipment 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
WCE Wireless Communication Emulator 
Currently European Train Control System (ETCS) rollout is a major concern for train manufacturers and railway 
infrastructure operators. Available ETCS equipment suffered from a long process before being put into service. One 
of the reason of such a long process deals with the need of the costly field-testing phase of ETCS on-board 
equipment. The laboratory procedures and tools need to be improved in order to reach the objective of “Zero On-
-Site Testing” searched for long time. 
Two of the main improvements have to do with: first, the testing of the safety functions of the ETCS on-board 
equipment; second, with the capability of reproducing in the laboratory the worst case scenarios that such equipment 
will encounter when put in the field. 
It is proved that ERTMS on-board equipment is considered a safety critical system and it must be designed 
against failures. For that, according to the corresponding normative, internal faults inside the ETCS sub-systems 
have to be injected to provide evidences of the robustness against failures. 
On the other hand, the presence of electromagnetic interferences (EMI) is considered as serious issue regarding 
the availability of the ETCS system, and therefore it also affects the cost and duration of the on-board equipment’s 
testing phase. Moreover, current laboratory procedures and tools don’t address completely the question of testing the 
equipment against the worst case of EMIs it must overcome when operating in real environments. 
This research work has been carried out with two objectives: first, to develop the suitable tools to enable the 
gathering of evidences regarding the safety functionalities of ETCS on-board equipment; second, to develop 
laboratory tools that allow to test that equipment in the worst conditions that its wireless interfaces can find in real 
environment, specially focusing on the electromagnetic interferences. 
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For that, two new laboratory tools have been created: the saboteur, an autonomous device prepared to test the 
safety of the equipment by injecting faults in the internal interfaces. And the Wireless Communication Emulator 
(WCE), a tools that can be used to inject different kinds of noise and interferers in the airgap between the wireless 
interfaces of the on-board equipment and the corresponding trackside equipment. Both tools have been designed 
taking into account the existing specifications regarding the testing laboratories in which they have to be integrated. 
This work shows how the design and implementation of these novel tools have been carried out. 
2. State of the Art and current problems 
This section introduces the safety testing and the Wireless Communication Emulation, moreover, the current 
issues are also described. 
2.1. Safety testing 
ERTMS on-board equipment has safety functions with a tolerable hazard rate of less than 10-9 F/h. The hazards 
of the different functions contributing to the core hazard of the ERTMS on-board equipment are identified in 
(SUBSET091) and a safety target for them is derived. Thus, all the functions have been assigned a THR and a safety 
integrity level (SIL). Therefore, ERTMS on-board sub-systems are designed against failures. (IEC61508) and 
(EN50129) impose requirements to the architecture to fulfil this safety figure as redundancy and physical 
independency. Moreover, (IEC61508) and (EN50129) require tests to assess safety, where Fault Injection is 
a mandatory part.  
As the normative defines, internal faults inside the ETCS sub-systems have to be injected to provide evidences to 
the Notified Body. These failures do not occur during normal operation, so if the test is only done as a black box as 
defined by ETCS test normative, the safe function implementations will not be tested since there is no ETCS 
technical specification to test safety. Traditional methods to inject faults cannot be used for safety assessment as 
they change the operations conditions of the product. 
Previous EU projects as (EMSET) only defined functional testing and therefore the normative available as 
(SUBSET076), (SUBSET094) for on-board ERTMS system validation testing, (SUBSET085) for BTM testing, and 
(SUBSET103) for LTM testing, only addresses functional tests. The entire test normative for the ETCS considers 
the systems or functionalities as black boxes and therefore extra functionality to implement reactive or composite 
safety is not evaluated, thus the fulfilment of (EN50129) or (IEC61508) is not assured with these tests. Therefore, 
ETCS test specification does not define any fault introduction to test safety of the equipment, even though it must be 
tested.  
2.2. Wireless Communication Emulation 
A number of norms exist regarding railway EMC as (EN50121) series, (EN50238), ((EN50388), (EN50122) and 
(EN50215)). These include train detection, signalling systems (BTM and LTM), and telecommunications (both land 
and air based). However, the limits defined do not ensure a safe operation. The scientific community has gone one 
step forward describing and analysing concrete situations of electromagnetic interferences (EMI) between the 
rolling stock and a wide range of systems, applications, etc., which are not covered by the previously mentioned 
standards, such as EMI and GSM-R (N. Ben Slimen et al. 2008), EMI and spot signalling systems (J. del Portillo et 
al. 2008), (I. Adin et al. 2012). However, the electromagnetic noise in the track is still unpredictable.  
Due to the noise and interferences in the railway environment, air-gap communication can be corrupted and 
therefore, ETCS service stopped. Some previous experiences have been found as ETCS has been out of service due 
to the problems found in the air-gap communication. Electromagnetic environment is not included when testing the 
system and therefore, air-gap problems are not translated to the test cases employed nowadays. Previous EC funded 
works have not addressed the problem entirely yet (i.e. (RAILCOM)), although nowadays, (TREND) project is 
working towards the full definition and modelling of the track noise.  
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2.3. Current issues 
The current technology employed in testing the ETCS onboard equipment shows some problems. On the one 
hand, the verification of the safety related functions as defined by (EN50128) and (EN50129) requires specific 
safety testing. However, the corresponding technical specification defining the test procedures for the safety 
requirements for the complete on-board ERTMS does not exist. Moreover, the necessary laboratory tools to address 
the testing of such safety features does not exist either. Thus, novel test strategies have to be developed and carried 
out to provide safety assessment evidences to the Notified Body. 
On the other hand, occasionally problems still appear even in already tested equipment because the trains have 
not been tested against the worst case real scenarios that the systems may find in the field (e.g. electromagnetic 
compatibility issues). Then, neither the responsibilities nor the technical solutions are straight forward. The duration 
of the field-testing employed to solve this railway EMC problems may vary between 3 and 12 months, and the cost 
of the complete process may vary between 25k€ to 1,5M€ (ERA 2010). This situation could be improved by 
employing a more realistic model of the air gap interfaces that the ETCS onboard equipment uses for some of its 
functionalities. 
3. Objectives 
The main objective of this research work consists of advancing towards the so called “Zero On-Site Testing” 
paradigm. For that, two secondary objectives must be fulfilled. 
(SUBSET076) specifies the methodology to test the on-board ERTMS system in order to assure the fulfilment of 
the functionality described in (SUBSET026) baseline v.2.3.0. The functional requirements for the test facilities 
currently available and its architecture in which all the test sequences from (SUBSET076) can be evaluated is 
defined in (SUBSET094). The testing methodology and laboratory architecture can be improved by overcoming 
their drawbacks, in order to reduce the time and effort in the verification and certification processes. 
Thus, the two improvements which lead to the fulfilment of the objectives are: 
x Fault injection in the internal and external interfaces to aid the safety assessment. By employing saboteurs in the 
interfaces it is possible to excite the functionality of the different subsystems in order to check the failsafe state. 
x Emulator of the dynamic behaviour of the wireless interfaces to test the on-board system with the representative 
worst case conditions these interfaces will find. Especially relevant is the inclusion of EM fields generated by the 
train during the regenerative break, the cross with other trains, or the reduction of the signal to noise ratio by the 
arcing of the pantograph. 
4. Proposal 
This research work proposes to add new tools to the ETCS On Board Class 1 reference test architecture specified 
in (SUBSET094). Fig. 1 shows the ETCS Advanced Testing Strategy proposed by EATS. Saboteurs and Wireless 
Communication Emulators have been defined and implemented by EATS project for that ETCS Advanced Testing 
Strategy. For testing and validation purposes, an implementation of the reference testing facility has been 
implemented. There is an equivalence between the modules of that implementation and the building blocks of the 
reference architecture. That equivalence is indicated by the acronyms in parenthesis. 
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Fig. 1. ETCS Advanced Testing Strategy. 
The strategy proposed by this work in order to overcome the first of the aforementioned problems consists of 
using fault injection techniques by means of saboteurs in communications between physically independent parts. 
The reproduction of the consequences in communications emulates faults in low levels, and the response of the 
complete system can be observed. 
On the other hand, the strategy followed to include the realistic air-gap scenario into the on-board ERTMS 
laboratory testing, Wireless Communication Emulators (WCE) are proposed. Two different WCE have been 
developed, one for each air-gap links of the on-board ERTMS system (BTM and LTM). As shown in Fig. 1, the 
Wireless Communication Emulators take the signal created by the simulators currently employed in the ETCS 
testing laboratory, and include the effects expected in the track due to noise and/or interferences. 
5. Saboteurs 
This section lists the faults to be injected by the saboteur and the interfaces to be sabotaged. Additionally, the 
implementation of the saboteurs is also shown.  
5.1. Faults to be injected 
The first step in developing new tools to test the safety functionality of ETCS onboard equipment consists of 
identifying the necessary safety requirements. Afterwards, EATS project completes ETCS specifications by defining 
the faults to be included to the system in order to assess its safety by means of saboteurs and therefore define a way 
of providing evidences to the Notified Body. 
This paper describes the methodology that has been followed, in order to define the mentioned faults. That 
methodology consists of the following steps: 
x Identify the hazards to which safety functions are related to. 
x Identify the safety functions of the module of the referred interface from the standard. 
x Identify specific functionality for the on-board equipment. 
x Identify specific hazards for the on-board equipment. 
x Identify the tasks that can fail and affect to the safety. 
x Identify the tasks that can fail and affect to the availability, if there are any. 
x Identify the faults that can be injected to provoke the failure of the previous tasks. 
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5.2. Interfaces to be sabotaged 
Fig. 1 shows which saboteurs have been developed are which interface each of them applies to: Driver Machine 
Interface (SUBSET033), Train Interface Unit (SUBSET034), Balise Transmission Module (SUBSET036), Loop 
Transmission Module (SUBSET044) and Odometer (EEIG 97E267). 
Internal communications between functionalities are company specific, for example the communication between 
BTM and the Kernel. Thus the company specific communications shall be adapted to the testing interfaces. For the 
testing interfaces Ethernet protocol has been chosen, since Ethernet is the protocol that is nowadays being employed 
for railway applications, including safety systems (M. Hassan et al. 2008), (M. Aziz et al. 2008) and (Westermo 
2011). 
Regarding the nature of the interfaces to be sabotaged, two types of saboteurs can be identified: 
x Interface saboteurs: these are the saboteurs that operate at packet level, modifying the data packets that travel 
through the Ethernet connection. 
x Physical saboteurs: for those interfaces that are defined as having a wireless transmission channel, interface 
saboteurs don’t fulfill all the requirements needed to inject the whole list of identified faults. This is due to the 
fact that some fault require to alter the physical properties of the wireless signal transmitted through these 
interfaces. Thus, saboteurs that operate at physical signal level have been created for the BTM and LTM 
interfaces. 
5.3. Implementation 
This subsection describes the implementation of the two types of saboteurs, the interface saboteurs and the 
physical saboteurs. 
5.3.1. Interface saboteurs 
Since message modification tasks does not require many resources consumption, interface saboteurs offer an 
efficient solution for EATS fault injection. Located in wired communication between devices, interface saboteurs 
modify the communication information between devices. Interface saboteurs are transparent for every device in 
EATS Laboratory and act as a logical bridge between devices whose communication is intended to be sabotaged. 
Fig. 2. ETCS Advanced Testing Strategy. 
Fig. 2 shows a layer diagram of communication and saboteur level actions. The intended traffic is captured 
through network and transport layers and information modification is done at “EATS Protocol Layer”. At “EATS 
Protocol Layer” each event has associated an event time with it (this event time makes reference to the relative time 
of each EATS event from the beginning of the simulation). Interface saboteur modifies, deletes or creates packets 
containing the information according to the event time. 
Interface saboteurs for EATS are implemented using “Rasbperry Pi model B” boards. The decision of choosing 
“Rasbperry Pi model B” has made based on its reduced size and running Linux feature, which enables the use of all 
routing characteristics that Linux OS offers. The operating system chosen for “Raspberry Pi” board is “Raspbian”. It 
provides more than a pure OS: it comes with over 35,000 packages, pre-compiled software bundled in a nice format 
for easy installation. Interface saboteurs make a special use of these Linux packages: 
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x Bridge-utils: it provides the functionality for making network bridges for network interfaces. 
x Netfilter/Iptables: it offers various options for packet filtering, network address translation, and port translation. 
Apart from those, interface saboteurs are endowed with a database and two “ad-hoc” running executables 
listening to them: 
x Interface Saboteur Database: each interface saboteur holds a MySQL database in order to store needed 
information for interface saboteur actions. 
x Listening Configurator: developed in Java. “Listening configurator” is listening at a TCP port. When 
a connection is made from EATS network configurator module to this port (it means that needed data for 
interface saboteur is set in Interface Saboteur Database) this software interprets filtering information at Interface 
Saboteur Database table and establishes the proper “iptables” rules for filtering actions. Once filtering 
configuration is done, it runs the actuators at specified ports. 
x Actuator: the actuator is an application executable developed in C language. This software performs sabotage 
actions based on Interface Saboteur Database information. 
5.3.2. Physical saboteurs 
Physical Saboteurs are implemented within the computational models that simulate the BTM and LTM 
components of the onboard ETCS equipment, and also within the models that simulate the Eurobalise and Euroloop 
signal generators. The saboteurs are integrated in them. The aim of these two saboteurs is to introduce faults at 
a physical level, operating inside the building blocks of these modules, in order to force an incorrect operation of the 
corresponding device. 
The Balise Transmission Module (BTM) physical saboteur operation is controlled from the Scenario Controller 
(SC). The SC provides saboteur with all the information required to make available to the EVC both correct BTM 
information and data signals including different types of errors adequate to evaluate the safety behavior of the EVC. 
Similarly to the BTM function, the saboteur architecture includes two sets of modules reproducing the 
functionalities of the trackside equipment (balise set) and the on-board one (on-board set), respectively. 
The Loop Transmission Module (LTM) physical saboteur operation is also controlled from the Scenario 
Controller (SC), which provides saboteur with all the information required to make available to the EVC both 
correct LTM information and data signals including different types of errors adequate to evaluate the safety 
behaviour of the EVC. Similarly to the LTM function, the saboteur architecture includes two sets of modules 






Fig. 3. (a) BTM physical saboteur architecture; (b) LTM physical saboteur architecture. 
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6. Wireless Communication Emulators (WCEs) 
The WCE reproduce the potential interferers that can be found in the air gap of BTM and LTM wireless 
communication channels. The identification of the potential interferers to be included in the emulators has been 
done first, and the design and implementation of the emulators has been carried out afterwards. 
6.1. Potential interferers 
Regarding the BTM operation, (SUBSET036) constitutes the mandatory requirements for achieving air-gap 
interoperability. Specifically for the threats to take into account for the BTM air gap, the section “6.7.4 In-band 
Susceptibility” has to be considered. This section defines that the Eurobalise on-board Transmission equipment 
(BTM) shall be able to operate when being exposed to a pure sinusoidal constant wave disturbance radiated noise 
and a transient as defined by Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4. Shape of the Damped Interference Signal. 
Regarding the LTM operation, it is (SUBSET103) that defines a number of expected interferers in front of which 
LTM has to accomplish its function. A list Test Signal of the On-board Equipment (TSOE) is included in the 
specification. 
6.2. Wireless Communication Emulator of the Balise Transmission Module 
The goal of the BTM WCE is to inject the balise signal accompanied by the noise interferers into the BTM 
function. Then, the sum of the signals could be faced prior to its injection in the air gap or subsequent to it. 
Moreover, the signals could be summed from the generation or from the reception, in the air or by software. The 
final option implemented in this research work is shown in Fig. 5. 
a  b  
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The main components are: a Signal Generator, which generates both the noise and balise signals; a Reference 
Loop, which inject the signal in the air gap; a BTM Antenna, which is in charge of receiving the signal coming from 
the air-gap; and the BTM function, composed of specific tools and components that reproduce the operation of the 
on-board BTM subsystem. 
6.3. Wireless Communication Emulator of the Loop Transmission Module 
This research work proposes the LTM Wireless Communication Emulator architecture shown in Fig. 6. It 
complements the overall LTM system and test-benches with the consideration of the air gap. The setup is similar to 
the one proposed for the BTM WCE. 
a  b 
 
Fig. 6. (a) LTM WCE architecture; (b) Laboratory implementation of LTM WCE. 
The main components are: a Signal Generator, which generates both the noise and balise signals; a Euroloop 
Leaky Cable Reference Tool (ERT), which inject the signal in the air gap; a LTM Antenna, which is in charge of 
receiving the signal coming from the air-gap; and the LTM function, composed of specific tools and components 
that reproduce the operation of the on-board BTM subsystem. 
7. Conclusions 
This research work shows the results obtained to reach the objective of “Zero On-Site Testing” for ETCS on-
-board equipment. For that, an analysis of the requirements made by the specifications has been done and current 
technology’s problems have been identified. In order to overcome those problems, two new tools are proposed: 
saboteurs, which inject faults deliberately in the internal interfaces of the equipment under test, and Wireless 
Communication Emulators, that generate and add noise and interferers to the wireless communication channels used 
by the ETCS equipment to communicate with the trackside equipment. 
These new tools provide the testing laboratories with the capability of increasing the number and type of tests to 
perform to ETCS equipment, thus reducing the duration and cost of field-testing. 
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